State machine replication is a common approach for making a distributed service highly available and resilient to failures, by replicating it on differentprocesses. It is wellknown, however; that the diflculty of ensuring the safety and liveness of a replicated service increases significantly when no synchrony assumptions are made, and when processes can exhibit Byzantine behaviors. The contribution of this work is to break the complexity of devising a Byzantineresilient state machine replication protocol, by decomposing it into key modular abstractions. In addition to being modular; the protocol we propose always preserves safety in presence of less than one third of Byzantine processes, independently of any synchrony assumptions. As for the liveness of our protocol, it relies on a Byzantine failure detector that encapsulates the suficient amount of synchrony.
Introduction
A widely adopted approach for providing a fault-tolerant service consists in replicating this service on a cluster of servers. In this context, the state machine replication approach defines a general framework to handle replication in a way that ensures the consistency of the replicated service. It is well-known, however, that providing a consistent replication protocol is a complex endeavor. This is particularly true in asynchronous distributed systems, i.e., in systems where there are no lower bounds on message transmission nor on relative process speeds. This complexity further increases when no restrictions are made on the failure model, i.e., when assuming a Byzantine model in which faulty processes can arbitrarily deviate from their specification. 
Contribution
The contribution of this work is to break the complexity of devising a Byzantine-resilient state machine replication protocol, by decomposing it into key subproblems and by solving each one via a separate abstraction. This modularity allows us to identify the additional synchrony assumptions under which the liveness of' our protocol is ensured (the FLP impossibility result' makes it impossible to ensure liveness without such additional assumptions). As for safety, our replication protocol always preserves it if less than one third of the replicas are Byzantine.
Roughly speaking, our state machine replication protocol relies on an atomic multicast primitive which clients use to send their requests to server replicas. The atomic multicast protocol we propose is then decomposed into a reliable multicast protocol and a protocol that solves a new problem that we name weak interactive consistency. This problem is a variation of the traditional interactive consistency problem [ 5 ] . Solving weak interactive consistency in an asynchronous model also lead us to define a new class of failure detectors adapted to the Byzantine model: such failure detectors are at the heart of liveness issues.2 Figure l depicts an overview of our approach.
Related Work
Rampart [ 101 and SecureRing protocols [7] are two research results on state machine replication in the Byzantine asynchronous model. A major difference with our work, however, lies in the fact that these systems heavily rely on membership protocols. Therefore, when some process is suspected (even falsely), a view change is triggered and 'FLP states that no algorithm can solve Consensus in an asynchronous *An in-depth discussion on the specification and the implementation of system if one process can crash [4] .
such failure detectors can be found in [3] .
State Machine Replication Protocol
Atomic Multicast Protocoi weak interactive consistency problem. Section 6 discusses safety and liveness issues of this solution, while Section 7 closes the paper.
Figure 1. A Modular Composition of Atomic Multicast
the suspected process is excluded from the new view. So, the atomic multicast protocol can go through a sequence of views where the number of correct processes decreases, while the number of Byzantine processes remains the same. This can end up with a view containing more than one third of Byzantine processes with respect to its total number of processes. In such a view, the safety of atomic multicast can be violated. As a consequence, with membership-based protocols even safety depends on synchrony assumptions, which is not the case of our state machine replication protocol.
A research result closer to ours is described in [ 11. There, the authors present a state machine replication protocol based on the idea of sequenced views, but with no exclusion of processes. In each view, only one process (the primary) is responsible for ordering client requests. Similarly to ours, the safety of their protocol is ensured independently of synchrony assumptions. Contrary to our approach, however, liveness issues are not encapsulated in a well-defined abstraction, i.e., a failure detector. Instead, liveness relies on the use of timeouts to prevent correct processes from being blocked by a Byzantine primary, and on an assumption on the sequence of views. This assumption states that there will eventually exist a view with a correct primary that other correct processes will not time out. Furthermore, the replication protocol proposed in [ 11 is monolithic, i.e., with no structural decomposition into subproblems. This lack of intermediate finer-grain abstractions leads to a protocol that is difficult to understand or reason about.
Roadmap
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our system model, in particular it introduces the notion of so-called muteness failures, together with an associated failure detector. Then, Section 3 presents our Byzantine-resilient state machine replication protocol, based on an atomic multicast primitive. Section 4 describes how an atomic multicast primitive can be built by composing a reliable multicast abstraction and a weak interactive consistency abstraction. Section 5 details our solution to the
System Model
We now describe the system model that we assume throughout this work, and which is a key element in proving the correctness of our modular protocol suite. Note however that not all the assumptions presented below are necessary to prove the correctness of each and every protocol. The existence of an adequate failure detector, for example, is only assumed when devising and proving our Weak Interactive Consistency protocol.
Execution & Communication Model. We consider a distributed system composed of a set of processes, N of which are servers (state machine replicas), and the remainder are clients. Processes communicate by message passing via a fully connected network composed of reliable pointto-point channels, i.e., if p sends message m to q, and both q and p are correct, then q eventually receives m. In addition, these channels guarantee FIFO order and preserve the integrity of messages exchanged between correct processes; in particular, the content of messages cannot be altered by some active intruder. We assume no bounds on relative process speeds nor on communication delays, i.e., the system is considered to be asynchronous.
Byzantine Failure Model. We assume a Byzantine failure model with message authentication [8] . In such a model, processes can fail by crashing (i.e., prematurely stop participating in the protocol), but can also behave maliciously. An incorrect process can for instance send garbled and misleading messages, or can refuse to send expected messages. More generally, Byzantine processes, also known as maliciousprocesses, can exhibit arbitrary behaviors. In contrast, a correct process executes an infinite number of steps, and respects the specification of the algorithm it is supposed to execute.
There exist however a limit to the power of malicious processes: thanks to message authentication, a malicious process cannot impersonate correct processes. Message authentication relies on the following signature unforgeability assumption: if a correct process p does not send a signed message m, then no correct process ever receives a message m correctly signed by p . In this paper, we assume that every correct process signs each of its messages before sending it.3 In addition, we assume that the maximum number of Byzantine processes among the N servers 3Signature unforgeability can be implemented via public-key encryption techniques such as RSA 1111.
is f < N / 3 . However, to simplify the presentation of our replication protocol, we state that N = 3f + 1 (note that any result that holds for N = 3f + 1 also holds for any N > 3 f ) . Finally, there is no restriction on the number of Byzantine clients.
Muteness Failure Detectors. As already suggested, our state machine replication protocol relies on a set of modular abstractions where distributed agreement plays a central role. So, in order to circumvent the FLP impossibility result, we augment our asynchronous distributed system with a so-called muteness failure detector OMA [3] . This failure detector only captures a subset of all possible Byzantine behaviors, namely muteness failure^.^ Such failures are tightly bound to the algorithm A that is executed by correct processes, and they are at the heard of liveness issues.
Intuitively, muteness failures characterize faulty processes from which correct processes stop receiving A messages. For example, a muteness failure can occur when a Byzantine process simply crashes, or arbitrarily decides to stop communicating with some or all correct processes. More precisely, we say that a process q is mute, with respect to some algorithm A and some correct process p , if p stops receiving forever A messages from q. We can then formally specify our muteness failure detector OMA, by stating the mute A-completeness and eventual weak A-accuracy properties that it satisfies. In this paper, OMA is only used by our Weak Interactive Consistency protocol, i.e., this protocol plays the role of A in the properties given below.
Mute A-completeness. There is a time after which every process that is mute to any correct process p , with respect to A, is suspected to be mute by p forever.
Eventual weak A-accuracy.
There is a time after which some correct process p is no more suspected to be mute, with respect to A, by any other correct process.
Byzantine-Resilient State Machine Replication
A state machine is defined by a set of state variables, which encodes its state, and by a set of remotely accessible commands, which allow to transform its state. Each command is implemented by a deterministic program and is executed atomically with respect to other commands. A client issues a request to the state machine, which specifies the execution of a command; depending on the command, the state machine might return a reply to the client or not. Requests must be processed by the state machine sequentially, 4Yet, muteness failures are more general than crash failures and in an order that is consistent with Lamport's causality relationship [9] . Intuitively, this relationship has two implications. First, the requests of each individual client must be processed in the order they were issued. Second, if there potentially exists a causal relationship between a request req made to the state machine by some client, and a subsequent request req' made by some other client, then req must be processed before reg'.
So, when devising a state machine replication protocol, two ordering problems must be addressed: the preservation of causality between client requests, and the implementation of a total order on the processing of requests by the state machine replicas. Total order is usually ensured by having the clients use an atomic multicast primitive to send their requests to the replicated state machine; this is the approach that we adopt here. As for causal order, there are basically two approaches to preserve it. One consists in delegating this problem to the communication layer, i.e., to devise an atomic multicast that additionally ensures causal order. The other approach consists in delegating it to the application layer, i.e., to let the clients and the state machine replicas address this problem.
In this work, we adopt the second approach. More precisely, we force each client that issues a request to the replicated state machine to refrain from any other communication, as long as it does not receive a response to its current request; this solution was proposed by F.B. Schneider in [ 131. Note that preserving causality between client requests at the application level has the advantage to avoid unnecessary ordering by the communication layer. Furthermore, devising a causal order multicast in the Byzantine failure model is still an open problem and it is not clear whether such a primitive would make sense or not [6] .
In rest of this section, we start by formally specifying the atomic multicast problem. We then describe how a state machine replication protocol can be built on top of a primitive that solves this problem, in presence of malicious failures. A modular protocol to implement such an atomic multicast primitive in the Byzantine failure model is described in the next section.
Atomic Multicast
In this paper, we consider an atomic multicast primitive that allows clients to send messages to some static group g of N server replicas; this conforms to our system model assumptions. Furthermore, we assume that clients do not belong to g and that only replicas in g deliver the clients' messages. Each message m sent by a client contains the following fields: seq(m), and op(m). Field seq(m) is a unique identifier associated with m and is composed of the client's identifier seq.id(m) plus a sequence number, e.g., the local clock of the client. Consequently, the identity of a message is defined by the client that issues it. Finally, field o p ( m ) specifies the operation (including parameters) that the client wants to execute on the replicated state machine. Formally, atomic multicast is defined by two primitives: Amulticast and Adeliver, which allow to send and deliver messages according to the following properties.
server in order to communicate its reply to the client that issued the associated request.
Atomic Multicast Layer. Then, the state machine replication layer relies on the atomic multicast layer to ensure the total order semantics. Network Layer. Finally, the basic send and receive primitives of the network are used either in the context of simple communications, e.g., sending servers replies, or in the more elaborate protocol implementing atomic multicast.
A Modular Atomic Multicast Protocol

A Protocol for State Machine Replication
The layered architecture depicted in Figure 2 shows how
We now propose a modular atomic multicast protocol based on two Byzantine-resilient abstractions: reliable multicast and weak interactive consistency (noted hereafter WIConsistency). The modularity of our approach is illustrated by the layered architecture depicted in Figure 1 . The role of the muteness failure detector, which is only used
In the following, we first present each abstraction independently and then we show how they cooperate to solve atomic a state machine replication protocol is built on top of an State Machine Replication L~~~~ application layers, as follows:
On top, the state machine replication protocol is used by both client and Server by the WIConsistency layer, be in Section 5.
0 On the client side, the replication layer interacts with the client layer via two primitives: request and reply. First, the request primitive allows a client to issue a request to the replicated servers. Note that all requestrelated information is encapsulated in the message m, e.g., the invoked command op, and the sequence number of the request seq(m). Second, the reply returned by the replicated servers, upon the processing of the request, is delivered to the client application layer via the reply primitive.
Note that the client waits for f + 1 correctly signed reply messages from distinct replicas in g, all with the same result. Waiting for f + 1 similar replies ensures multicast.
Reliable Multicast
Reliable multicast is defined by two primitives: R-multicast and R-deliver, which enable to send and deliver messages according to the validity, integrity and agreement properties given in Section 3.1, when replacing Amulticast and A-deliver with Rmulticast and R-deliver respectively. The implementation of this communication primitive consists in a simple diffusion protocol.
Weak Interactive Consistency
that at least one reply was sent by a correct replica and hence is valid. Until then, c does not issue any other communication.
The WIConsistency problem is a variation of the original interactive consistency problem [5] . In the latter, each correct process proposes its initial value, and then each correct process must decide on the same vector of initial values with an element for each process; the element corresponding to a given correct process must be the initial value of this process. The WIConsistency problem has a weaker specification: each correct process proposes its initial value, and 0 On the server side, the replication protocol layer interacts with the server layer via two primitives: return and process. The replication layer delivers client requests to the server layer via the process primitive. Furthermore, the return primitive is invoked by the A correct process launches an instance of WIConsistency by invoking the propose primitive with its initial value. When an instance of WIConsistency is completed for some correct process p, we say that p decides and the decision value is the value returned by the propose primitive. More precisely, the problem is characterized by the properties given below. Section 5 presents our WIConsistency protocol.
Agreement. No two correct processes decide differently.
Validity. The decided set contains at least one initial value of a correct process. Termination. Every correct process eventually decides.
Composing Atomic Multicast Protocol
We now describe how, in presence of Byzantine failures, the two above abstractions can be transformed into an atomic multicast protocol. The principle of this transformation is inspired from the structure of [2] that transforms consensus and reliable broadcast into atomic broadcast in the crash model. This set contains messages that have been atomically delivered, i.e., using primitive A-deliver (line 16). A-undelivered. This set contains the messages that have been reliably delivered, i.e., R-delivered, but not yet atomically delivered.
In T a s k 2 (lines 8-17), when a correct process p notices that set A-undelivered is not empty, p launches a new instance of WIConsistency with A-undelivered as its initial value, and k as a sequence number that disambiguates concurrent executions of WIConsistency (line 1 1). Then p waits for the decision value, which is set DecideSet (line 12). Having set Decideset, process p collects the union of all messages that appear in this set, i.e., UiDecideSet [i] . This results in a list of messages noted MsgSet (line 13).
Process p then removes incorrectly signed messages, mutant messages and redundant messages from set MsgSet. The definition of these messages and the reasons for which they are removed are given below. Note that such misleading messages can be safely removed because no correct process sends such messages.
Incorrectly Signed Messages.
Removing all incorrectly signed messages avoids to A-deliver messages of which senders cannot be authenticated (line 14). From the perspective of the state machine replication protocol, this means the atomic multicast protocol prevents correct replicas from A-delivering, and hence from proceeding, any request that is not correctly signed.
Mutant Messages. We also remove from MsgSet so- The removal of the above misleading messages results in set A-deliverk : all messages that remain in A-deliverk are then delivered according to some deterministic order (line 17). Finally, p updates its A-delivered set by augmenting it with all the messages inA-deliverk (line 18).
A Weak Interactive Consistency Protocol
The full version of WIConsistency is given by Figure 5 .
This algorithm processes in asynchronous rounds and relies on the rotating coordinator and the failure detector paradigms.6 Before proceeding with the description of the algorithm, we first define the key notion of certijicate.
5The terminology of mutant messages was introduced by Kihlstrom et 6This algorithm is inspired by a decentralized version of Consensus al. in [7] . Certificates. Certificates are introduced to cope with socalled invalid messages. To define the notion of invalid messages, we introduce the relationship 4 between two events.
Let el be the event of receiving a set of messages s m l by a process p, and let e2 be the event of sending some message m2 by the same process p. We say that el precedes e2, noted e l i e 2 , if the event e2 of sending m2 is conditioned by the event e l of receiving set ~m l .~ From an algorithmic viewpoint, this definition can be translated as follow: "if receive s m l then send m2". In a trusted model, i.e., one that excludes malicious behaviors, when some process performs an event e2, such that elAe2, it is trivially ensured that (1) el happened before e2, and (2) s m l was correctly taken into account to compute m2. In contrast, this is no longer guaranteed in a Byzantine model. A Byzantine process may perform e2 either without hearing about e l , or without taking into account the occurrence of e l . The resulting message m2 sent by a Byzantine process is referred to as an invalid message.
The validity of some message m2 is proved by exhibiting, in the certificate appended to m2, that the reception of set s m l has indeed occurred. Then, based on set s m l , any correct process can check if s m l was correctly taken into account to compute m2. In other words, having set s m l and knowing how s m l should be taken into account to generate m2, each correct process can check the validity of m2. Therefore, the structure of any certificate consists in a collection of signed messages that compose ~m 1 .~
Detailed Algorithm
The algorithm starts with a preliminary phase during which a set of f + 1 values collected from different processes is constructed. Then, after this phase, two concurrent tasks are launched (Tusk 1 and T u s k 2 ) to allow correct processes to eventually decide on the same set of values. In the following, p is any correct process executing Figure 5 , while q is another process (correct or not) with which p interacts.
Preliminary Phase. (lines 3-6)
During this phase, process p sends all processes its initial value in a signed message. Then, p collects f + 1 correctly signed values from different processes. This set of values setp is the estimate with which p participates in T a s k l . Task 1. Task 1 is divided in two phases. In Phase 1, every correct process tries to decide on the estimate of the current 'Note that the precedence relationship used here is slightly different from that of [9] , in that it involves a message and a set of messuges (rather than two messages).
8At the beginning of the protocol, i.e., T = 1, some messages m2 may not carry any certificate because there is no previous s m l was received. In such a case, m2 is validated by an empty certificate. Figure 6 ). If c, is suspected by at least 2f + 1 processes, then p proceeds to Phase 2 before moving to the next round (see Phase2 of Figure 6 ). Throughout Task 1, a local predicate Byzantine,(q) is associated to every process q by p ; initially, this predicate is false. As soon as p detects some misbehavior exhibited by q, like sending invalid messages or sending an estimate that is not a set of values, p sets its local predicate Byzantine,(q) to true, which means that p suspects q.
0 Phase 1 (lines 10-27). During Phase 1, current coordinator c, uses a centralized Echo Broadcast [ 14, 101 to send its estimate to all processes. The Echo Broadcast protocol prevents a Byzantine coordinator from sending different estimates to different correct processes; this is an instance of the well-known Byzantine Generals Problem [8] . So, first c, sends its estimate set,.
in a signed Initial message to all processes (line 11). When process p receives this message for the first time, p checks if it is a valid message, i.e., with an esti- The WIConsistency is at the heart of the safety and liveness of our state machine replication protocol. For this reason, this section sketches how these two properties are ensured in the WIConsistency protocol proposed in Section 5.
Safety. The safety of WIConsistency encompasses both agreement and validity. Agreement relies on the Echo Broadcast protocol, on the locking of the decision value, and on certificates. The Echo Broadcast protocol preserves agreement within a round. When a decision is made on some estimate set, we have at least f + 1 correct processes that delivered set. Once set is delivered by f + 1 correct processes, there is no other estimate that can be delivered by correct processes from that time onward; this is what we mean by "locking" the decision value. Certificates prevent Byzantine processes from misleading correct ones into deciding on different estimates, which would result in violating the agreement property.
Regarding the validity property, no process can successfully echo broadcast an estimate that does not match the expected format, i.e., not composed of f + 1 correctly signed messages (q, e4). So, any decided estimate is a set o f f + 1 values. In the presence of at most f Byzantine processes, this set contains at least one initial value of a correct process. In conclusion, notice that the safety properties (agreement and validity) are preserved whatever the assumptions on system synchrony, i.e., the outputs of failure detector.
Liveness. The liveness of WIConsistency corresponds to its termination property. The correctness of this property is based on the presence of at least 2f + 1 correct processes, on reliable and FIFO communication channels, and on the properties of failure detector OMd. The presence of at least 2f + 1 correct processes and of reliable communication channels ensures that when 2f + 1 messages are expected, they are eventually received, thus avoiding any blocking wait in our algorithm. The mute A-completeness of O M A prevents Byzantine processes from stopping the progress of the protocol, by suspecting mute processes. Indeed, the malicious processes that can prevent the progress of the WIConsistency protocol are those that crash or arbitrarily decide to stop sending messages.
Furthermore, eventual weak A-accuracy expresses the ability of OM-4 to eventually stop falsely suspecting some correct process. This property prevents correct processes from always moving to the next round without deciding, i.e., it allows them to reach some round with no suspected correct coordinator; the protocol can then terminate. Note that a Byzantine process could stop sending expected messages but continue sending other messages, like Suspicion messages (line 29). For our failure detector, such a process is not mute. Furthermore, some messages sent by such a process could be always be valid since they do not need a certificate.' We solve this problem by using the FIFO property of our communication channels and by using the fact that, in any round, every correct process only sends a bounded number n b of messages. Consequently, if a correct process p expects in round T a message from some process q, it periodically checks if it receives more than n b * T messages from q without receiving the expected message. With this test, Byzantine processes that skip expected messages without being mute are detected.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we proposed a set of modular abstractions that reduce the complexity of devising a Byzantine-resilient replication protocol, in an asynchronous system. The resulting modular replication protocol is built on top of an atomic multicast communication primitive. In turn, this communication primitive is obtained by reduction to a new agreement problem, named weak interactive consistency. Our solution to this new problem consisted in an incremental transformation of a crash-resilient consensus protocol into a Byzantine-resilient weak interactive consistency proto-'Not all messages in our algorithm need certificate to be valid, e.g., Suspicion messages.
col. Solving the weak interactive consistency problem leads us to define a new failure detector abstraction that better suits the Byzantine failure model. O u r new failure detector, named the muteness failure detector OMA, encapsulates the amount of synchrony needed to solve the w e a k interactive consistency problem. Muteness failure detector QMA is thus the cornerstone of the liveness property of our state machine replication protocol. Regarding safety, our replication protocol always ensures it, if less than the third of the replicated servers are Byzantine.
